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THE UNINTENDED PREGNANCY CRISIS: A NOFAULT FIX
Eric Lindenfeld*
There is an ongoing and concerning public health problem in
the United States relating to unintended pregnancies. Despite the
fact that women consistently express dissatisfaction with existing
contraception methods, the availability of cutting edge
technologies remains stagnant. This paper argues that the threat
of liability in the form on product liability lawsuits dissuades
contraceptive manufacturers from innovating. This paper
proposes a no-fault fix to the problem modeled around the
National Childhood Vaccine Act of 1986.
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INTRODUCTION

In the United States, there is an ongoing and concerning
public health problem: the large number of unintended
pregnancies. Over one-half of the 6.6 million annual pregnancies
in the United States are unintended.1 According to some
estimates, a woman in the United States should expect to have
1.42 unintended pregnancies by age forty-five.2 The United
States unintended pregnancy rate is considerably higher than the
comparable rate in many other developed, first world countries.3
While it is true that two-thirds of women in the United States are
on some form of contraception,4 almost half of all unintended
pregnancies result from women who use their contraception
inconsistently or incorrectly.5 The remaining fifty-four percent of
unintended pregnancies are a result of women who continue to
abstain from any contraceptive method at all.6
The unintended pregnancy rate is particularly concerning
given that childbirths that result from unintended or closely
spaced pregnancies are correlated with negative outcomes for the
parent and child.7 For example, research has shown that,
compared to women who become pregnant intentionally, “women
who experience unintended pregnancies have a higher incidence
of mental-health problems, have less stabled romantic
relationships, experience higher rates of physical abuse, and are
more likely to have abortions or to delay the initiation of prenatal
care.”8 Similarly, children resulting from unintended pregnancies
are at risk of experiencing negative physical and mental health
issues, and “are more likely to drop out of high school and to
1. See Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. (July
2015),
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-Unintended-Pregnancy-US.html
(“Currently, about half (51% of the 6.6 million pregnancies in the United States each
year (3.4 million) are unintended.”).
2. Lisa Campo-Engelstein, Gender Norms and Contraceptive Trust, 23 ALB. L.
J. SCI. & TECH. 581, 599 (2013).
3. See Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. See Campo-Engelstein, supra note 2, at 599-600 (“Women who are dissatisfied
with their contraceptive method are at high risk for experiencing a gap in
contraceptive coverage.”).
6. See Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, supra note 1.
7. Id.
8. Adam Thomas & Emily Monea, The High Cost of Unintended Pregnancy, CTR.
ON
CHILDREN
AND
FAMILIES
AT
BROOKINGS
2
(July
2011),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/7/uninteded-pregnancythomas-monea/07_unintended_pregnancy_thomas_monea.pdf.
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engage in delinquent behavior during their teenage years.”9
This paper proceeds in four parts. Part II of this paper details
the unintended pregnancy crisis and explains how it can be
attributed to dissatisfaction with existing contraceptive products.
Part III offers an overview of the past forty years of product
liability lawsuits for contraceptive products, and argues that the
threat of liability is the reason for the lack of innovation of new,
cutting edge contraceptive products. Part IV then explores, in
depth, the theories proffered by advocates of federal preemption,
ultimately concluding that it is a poor solution and an
unnecessarily broad approach to the growing crisis. Having
established the fundamental issues and misunderstandings, Part
V argues that the most plausible solution to the unintended
pregnancy crisis is a no-fault compensation plan for those injured
by contraceptive products. Additionally, this Article argues that
such a scheme could be modeled around the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (NCVIA),10 which has proven to be
successful at insulating manufacturers from unpredictable
liability11 as well as stimulating research into cutting edge
products.12 Most importantly, NCVIA has been shown to be
extremely effective in offering injured consumers an equitable
form of compensation.13
II. THE UNINTENDED PREGNANCY CRISIS
A. DISSATISFACTION WITH EXISTING CONTRACEPTIVE
METHODS
The Guttmacher Institute has found that the most widely
reported reason for contraceptive nonuse or misuse includes
dissatisfaction with available contraceptive methods and
concerns about side effects of alternatives.14 For example, the
Center for Disease Control (CDC) has found that nearly thirty
9. Id.
10. Joanna B. Apolinsky & Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Rethinking Liability for Vaccine
Injury, 19 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 537, 551 (2010)
11. Clare Looker & Heath Kelly, No-Fault Compensation Following Adverse
Events Attributed to Vaccination: A Review of International Programmes, WHO (July
18, 2016), http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/89/5/10-081901/en/.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Sneha Barot, In Search of Breakthroughs: Renewing Support for
Contraceptive Research and Development, 16 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 1, 2 (2013),
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/16/1/gpr160124.html.
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percent of all users stop using the pill due to side effects that
include “nausea, weight gain, sore or swollen breasts, spotting
and mood changes.”15 In 2010, a study conducted by the Journal
of Family Practice determined that only fifty-seven percent of
women on the pill were happy with it.16 In fact, studies still show
that even the use of lower dose hormonal contraceptive pills
subjects the user to high risks of depression and decreases in
libido.17
Most other methods of contraception have
discontinuation rates of almost fifty percent after one year of
use.18 A more recent report published by the CDC has found that
nearly half the women surveyed had discontinued some form of
contraception because they disliked it or were concerned about its
side effects, and almost one-third of all women tried five or more
types of birth control.19
Despite the fact that women consistently express
dissatisfaction with existing contraception methods, the
availability of cutting-edge contraceptive methods remains
stagnant.20 To be clear, there have been important advances since
the advent of the pill; developments such as contraceptive
implants, patches, and vaginal rings have all attempted to meet
the diverse needs of women throughout their reproductive lives.21
However, these items have predominantly been variations of preexisting technologies, such as variants of hormone dosage levels
and delivery methods as opposed to any significant technological
breakthrough.22 Indeed, a close examination of the contraceptive
landscape reveals that all birth control continues to fit into the
following four categories: barrier method, hormonal method,
natural method, and permanent method.23 It appears then, that
15. See Nadia Kounang, For Birth Control, What’s Old is New Again, CNN (Jan.
8,
2015),
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/08/health/fertility-awareness-methods/
(“Some 30& of women quit hormonal birth control because of the side effects.”).
16. Ann Friedman, Why Isn’t Birth Control Getting Better?, GOOD: A MAGAZINE
FOR THE GLOB. CITIZEN (Apr. 24, 2011), https://www.good.is/articles/why-isn-t-birthcontrol-getting-better.
17. Id.
18. See Campo-Engelstein, supra note 2, at 600.
19. Madeleine Schwartz, Where’s Better Birth Control?, NEW YORKER (Nov. 21,
2014) http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/wheres-better-birth-control.
20. Id.
21. See id. (“There have been some new developments: contraceptive implants,
patches, and vaginal rings, like the NuvaRing, free users from having to take a daily
pill; ella, a pill that can be taken up to five days after sex, received F.D.A. approval in
2010.”).
22. See Barot, supra note 14, at 1.
23. What Are The Different Types of Contraception?, EUNICE KENNEDY SHRIVER
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any new contraceptives marketed today are simply modifications
of technologies and sciences that are more than fifty years old.24
B. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INTO ALTERNATIVES
REMAIN STAGNANT
It should not come as a surprise that technological
developments in the contraceptive arena is moribund—
investment in this field is at an all-time low.25 Commercial
investment for research of new contraceptive methods accounted
for only $33 million in 2013.26 Pharmaceutical companies are
simply not interested in developing contraceptive products. For
example, a survey conducted by the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), has indicated that, for 371
female-specific new drugs on the market, only ten were
contraceptives; there were, however, “71 new drugs for women’s
cancers, 55 for arthritis, 45 for autoimmune diseases, 41 for
diabetes, and 31 for psychiatric conditions.”27 Since, generally
speaking, new drug discovery and development is led by the
private sector, it is troubling that most large pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies have largely abandoned the field of
contraceptive research and development.28
This extreme lull in contraceptive research exists despite
clear indications that women are desperately searching for
alternative options.29 For example, a recent study indicated that
women would enjoy the option to take the “Pericoital”
contraceptive, a discreet alternative to an everyday pill.30 In
effect, Pericoital would allow women a safe option to take a

NAT’L INST. OF CHILD HEALTH AND HUMAN DEV. (last reviewed Apr. 3, 2013),
https://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/contraception/conditioninfo/Pages/types.aspx
.
24. Elizabeth Siegel Watkins, How the Pill Became a Lifestyle Drug: The
Pharmaceutical Industry and Birth Control in the United States Since 1960, 102 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 1, 1 (2012), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3464843/.
25. See Barot, supra note 14, at 7-8.
26. Mary Moran et al., Reproductive Health: R&D For the Developing World, Pol’y
Cures:
G-Finder
11
(2014),
http://www.policy
cures.org/downloads/RH%20full%20report.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2016).
27. ROBERT A. HATCHER ET AL., CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 437-38 (19th ed.
2007).
28. See Barot, supra note 14, at 7.
29. See Schwartz, supra note 19, at 2.
30. Jane K. Cover et al., Consumer Perspectives on a Pericoital Contraceptive Pill
in
India
and
Uganda,
39(4)
GUTTMACHER
INST.
1,
6
(2013),
https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3919513.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2016).
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contraceptive before or after sex rather than on an everyday
basis.31 However, as of yet, Pericoital has not been brought to
market in the United States.32 Similarly, movement on a
contraceptive gel that women could rub on their arm or leg has
been slow, despite reports that the drug could be a revolutionary,
and almost side effect-less alternative to the birth control pill.33
Multipurpose
prevention
technologies,
which
would
simultaneously protect against pregnancy and sexually
transmitted diseases have also been slow to come to market.34
Finally, while there has been talk for over thirty years about a
male contraceptive, none have yet been brought to market in the
United States.35 Commentators have suggested that this lack of
contraceptive research development is not a result of any demandbased deficiency.36
III. CONTRACEPTIVES AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY
It has been argued that threat of liability is the primary
reason for private sector abandonment of the field of contraceptive
research and development.37 Pharmaceutical companies, driven
largely by profit, are simply responding to the legitimate threat of
large-scale lawsuits. Given the tremendous risk of liability, and
the associated damaging publicity, investments in contraceptive

31. Evette Dionne, A Different Kind of Birth Control Pill, N.Y. TIMES: THE
OPINION
PAGES,
Jan.
10,
2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/01/01/thinking-beyond-the-birthcontrol-pill/a-different-kind-of-birth-control-pill.
32. See id.
33. Clay Dillow, Daily Rub-On Contraceptive Skin Gel Could Replace the Pill,
POPULAR SCIENCE, Oct. 26, 2010, http://www.popsci.com/science/article/2010-10/dailycontraceptive-gel-effective-pill-without-side-effects.
34. See Schwartz, supra note 19, at 2.
35. Latest Research on New Birth Control Methods, Epigee Women’s Health,
http://www.epigee.org/guide/future.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2016).
36. See Annette L. Marthaler, The FDA Defense: A Prescription for Easing the
Pain of Punitive Damage Awards in Medical Products Liability Cases, 19 HAMLINE L.
REV. 451, 471 (1996).
37. See, e.g., Jerome F. Strauss III & Michael Kafrissen, Waiting For The Second
Coming: Contraceptive Research Is Seriously in Need of Revitalization, 432 NATURE
43, 43-44 (Nov. 4, 2004), http://www.nature.com/nature (arguing that liability hinders
contraceptive researching, depriving 1.5 billion women of innovative products); Anna
Birenbaum, Shielding the Masses: How Litigation Changed the Face of Birth Control,
10 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. 411, 423 (2001) (discussing Dalkon Shield and
Norplant litigation, arguing that they had devastating impacts for the industry going
forward).
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products are simply no longer profitable.38 The history is clear: in
the past sixty-five years since the “pill” has been introduced,39 the
contraceptive arena has been plagued by successive, highly
publicized product liability lawsuits.40 The increase in product
liability suits also closely corresponds to the rapid departure from
the contraceptive market by drug and device manufacturers. For
example, prior to the 1970s and 1980s, the United States led the
world in contraceptive development.41 However, today, there are
only a few American manufacturers that continue to research and
develop contraceptive products.42 Any person who continues to
believe that liability concerns are not heavily influencing
pharmaceutical company business decisions should consider the
examples below.
A. THE PILL
The pill is arguably the most socially and economically
significant invention of the twentieth century. Introduced in the
United States in 1960 by G.D. Searle & Co. as nearly 100-percent
effective, “Envoid” quickly gained recognition as the most reliable
way for women to control their own fertility.43 However, almost
immediately following the oral contraceptive’s release, women
began to report serious side effects including strokes, blood clots,
cancers, birth defects, aneurysms, and heart attacks.44
Gynecologists, who were often not informed or were simply
unaware of the side effects of the pill, frequently dismissed their
patients’ complaints as exaggerations.45
Others made the
unilateral decision to not advise their patients as to the side
effects of the pill, based on the common belief that “women, being
very ‘emotional,’ might overreact. Not wanting to unduly alarm

38. Birenbaum, supra note 37, at 423.
39. The Birth Control Pill: A History, Planned Parenthood 1, 4 (last updated Mar.
2013), https://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/1213/9611/6329/pillhistory.pdf.
40. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL INST. OF MED., DEVELOPING NEW
CONTRACEPTIVES: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 121-22 (Luigi Mastroianni, Jr. et
al. eds., 1990), http://www.nap.edu/catalog/1450.html.
41. See Birenbaum, supra note 37, at 423.
42. See Barot, supra note 14, at 7.
43. People & Events: The Side Effects of the Pill, PBS: Am. Experience,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/pill/peopleevents/e_effects.html (last visited Aug. 1,
2016).
44. William M. Brown, Déjà vu All Over Again: The Exodus from Contraceptive
Research and How to Reverse It, 40 BRANDEIS L. J. 1, 26 (2002).
45. See People & Events: The Side Effects of the Pill, supra note 43.
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women, doctors took the decision out of their patients’ hands.”46
It was not long before the product liability suits began to
enter the courts. The first case that considered alleged defects in
the Envoid pill was that of Simonait v. Searle.47 There, the
plaintiff alleged failure to warn and breach of implied warranty
after she contracted thrombophlebitis, a blood clot disorder.48
Following a lengthy jury trial, which included the expert
testimony by G.D. Searle’s lead investigatory doctors, the jury
returned a verdict for the defense.49 Another early case, Black v.
Searle,50 involved G.D. Searle’s Envoid. The lawsuit was brought
to trial in 1969 and involved a twenty-nine-year-old woman who
died from a pulmonary embolism.51 While the plaintiffs were able
to show that, at the time of the woman’s death, there were more
than 600 reports of thromboembolic phenomena, they still
encountered serious problems with respect to proving causation.52
Ultimately, the jury again found for the defendant, but this time
added a recommendation to their verdict, suggesting that G.D.
Searle add more intensive warnings to their product.53
Motivated by the overwhelming reports from injured women,
Barbara Seaman, a leading activist and journalist for the women’s
health movement, authored a book in 1969 that described the
crisis and the urgent need for safer alternatives.54 In her book,
Seaman included testimony from world renowned physicians and
researchers who questioned the safety of the pill.55 The book,
along with calls from similar activists,56 soon prompted the

46. People & Events: The Pill and The Doctor/Patient Relationship, PBS: Am.
Experience, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/pill/peopleevents/e_health.html (last
visited Aug. 1, 2016).
47. Circuit Court for County of Kent, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Civil Case No.
1916, tried May 18-26, 1965; Joyce Barrett, Product Liability and the Pill, 19 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 468, 468 (1970).
48. Id.
49. Circuit Court for County of Kent, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Civil Case No.
1916, tried May 18-26, 1965; Barrett, supra note 47, at 469.
50. U.S. Dist. Ct. of Northern District of Indiana—South Bend Division, Civil
Case No. 4082 (1969); Barrett, supra note 47, at 469.
51. Id.
52. Barrett, supra note 47, at 469.
53. Id. at 470.
54. Brown, supra note 44, at 26.
55. See People & Events: The Side Effects of the Pill, supra note 43.
56. People & Events: The Senate Holds Hearings on the Pill (1970), PBS:
American
Experience,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/pill/peopleevents/e_hearings.html (last visited Aug. 1,
2016).
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United States Senate to hold hearings in January 1970 to address
the widespread adverse events.57 Almost immediately after the
hearings, hormone levels in the pill were decreased to a small
fraction of what they were originally.58 Despite the lower doses,
product liability lawsuits continued through the 1970s and 1980s,
but saw limited success as the pills became safer and the
warnings more comprehensive.59
B. DALKON SHIELD
The Dalkon Shield, invented in 1968, was a device that was
inserted into a woman’s uterus that prevented the implantation
of a fertilized egg.60 The intrauterine device, commonly known as
the “IUD,” was engineered with spikes along its edges to prevent
instances of natural expulsion from the body.61 The IUD also
contained a string that passed from the uterus into the vagina.62
Based upon an impressive, year-long study in which the device
purportedly achieved a 98.9-percent success rate,63 the device was
picked up by the A.H Robins Company in 1970.64 From the
device’s inception, doctors, scientists, and sources within the
company advised that the product could potentially cause pelvic
infections, septic abortions, and higher-than-reported pregnancy
rates.65 Despite the ominous warnings, A.H. Robins Company
57. Michael J. Malinowski, Doctors, Patients, and Pills—A System Popping
Under Too Much Physician Discretion? A Law-Policy Prescription to Make Drug
Approval More Meaningful in the Delivery of Health Care, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1085,
1086 (2012).
58. Id. at 1087.
59. Sylvia A. Law, Tort Liability and the Availability of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices in the United States, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 339, 381 (1997).
60. Id. at 362-63.
61. Lucy Vernasco & Arikia Millikan, The IUD’s Long Path to Redemption,
MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 24, 2015), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-iuds-long-pathto-redemption.
62. Anna C., “Instrument of Torture”: The Dalkon Shield Disaster, Planned
Parenthood
Advocates
of
Ariz.
(Mar.
28,
2016),
http://advocatesaz.org/2016/03/28/instrument-of-torture-the-dalkon-shield-disaster/.
63. Robert L. Shirley, The Dalkon Shield in Private Practice: A Disappointment,
in 121 AM. J. OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 564 (1975).
64. Ron Wolf, A.H. Robins’ Struggle Is Over the End of a Dream – And of a
Nightmare, PHILLY.COM (July 5, 1987), http://articles.philly.com/1987-0705/business/26198061_1_robins-board-robins-family-claiborne-robins.
65. Russell Mokhiber, The Dalkon Shield: A Deadly Product from A.H. Robins, 8
MULTINATIONAL MONITOR: CORP. CRIME & VIOLENCE 1, 2-3 (1987),
http://multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1987/04/ahrobins.html (An internal A.H.
Robins memo informed almost 40 A.H. Robins executives, just before the Shield
entered the market, of the dangerous, wicking properties of the string.).
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marketed the product to the public as “[t]he modern superior
I.U.D. [providing] safe, sure, sensible contraception.”66 By 1973,
over three million women were using the new contraceptive
product.67
Almost immediately, women began reporting adverse effects
associated with the shield, including pain and bleeding, uterus
perforation, and infections that led to miscarriages, stillbirths,
and death.68 Once again, A.H. Robins Company became aware of
the reports, but did little to warn doctors about the risks.69 The
company also failed to investigate the reports.70 Finally, in 1974,
the American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, along with
the FDA, pressured A.H. Robins Company to suspend the
manufacture and sale of the Dalkon Shield in the United States
until the product’s dangers could be more thoroughly
investigated.71 However, it was not until 1980 that the company
sent letters to women, urging that they have their Dalkon Shields
removed, and telling them that A.H. Robins Company would cover
all associated expenses.72
The first wave of lawsuits against A.H. Robins Company
commenced in 1974.73 Known for insinuating that the injured
woman’s hygiene and sexual misconduct was the impetus for the
injury, A.H. Robins Company won a number of successive defense
verdicts.74 In fact, in the 1970s, the company was only required
to pay out an average of $11,000 per claim.75 However, in 1983,
the tide turned for plaintiffs when the small firm handling a

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 195-96 (Colo. 1984).
See Law, supra note 59, at 364.
See Mokhiber, supra note 65, at 2.
Id.
Id.
See Law, supra note 59, at 365.
David Ranii, First Public Federal Disciple Hearing, 6 Jud. Conduct Rep. 1, 5
(1984) (“Robins took the Dalkon Shield off the market in 1974 and, in 1980, mailed a
letter to 200,000 physicians and government agencies recommending the removal of
the device from any women still using it. But the product has never been recalled, and
critics of the shield believe an untold number of women are still wearing it today.”).
73. Charles A. Homsy, How FDA Regulations and Injury Litigation Cripple the
Medical
Device
Industry,
USA
TODAY
(July
2003),
http://www.questia.com/magazine/1G1-104971300/how-fda-regulations-and-injurylitigation-cripple.
74. See Mokhiber, supra note 65, at 3-4 (“At trial, the company has, in some
instances, sought to defend itself by shifting the blame to the victims. A.H. Robins’
attorneys have argued that frequent sexual intercourse with multiple partners could
cause injuries currently being blamed on the shield.”).
75. See Law, supra note 60, at 366.
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majority of the cases was forced to pass the cases to a large and
experienced Minneapolis-based firm Robins, Zelle, Larson and
Kaplan.76 Led by high-powered attorneys, Dale Larson and
Michael Ciresi, the plaintiffs managed to consolidate a number of
their cases and secured successive multi-million dollar verdicts
based on defective design and willful negligence claims.77 News
of Ciresi’s and Larson’s victories soon emboldened other plaintiffs’
attorneys to pursue Dalkon Shield cases.78 Faced with billions of
dollars in liability exposure and damaging press, A.H. Robins
Company filed for bankruptcy in 1986.79
Kirsten Thompson, researcher at the University of
California, San Francisco, noted the effect that A.H. Robins
Company’s bankruptcy had on the industry: “The idea that a
company could go bankrupt because of a contraceptive product
was pretty horrifying.”80 Indeed, Dalkon Shield litigation and the
resulting bankruptcy cast a shadow over IUD development for the
past thirty years.81 From 1983 to 1988, not a single IUD was
marketed in the United States, as the horror stories still lingered
in women’s consciences.82 In 1988, a newer type of IUD,
“Paragarud,” was introduced but achieved limited success.83 It
took another eleven years until “Mirena,” a modern version of the
hormonal IUD was developed.84 Mirena has seen more success
than previous IUDs,85 but manufacturers, still tentative about
future liability, have consistently charged astronomical prices for
these devices at approximately $500 to $800 per device.86
76. Richard B. Sobol, Bending the Law: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD
BANKRUPTCY 16 (1991).
77. Guide to the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust Collection, VIRGINIA HERITAGE
(2002), http://ead.lib.virginia.edu/vivaxtf/view?docId=uva-law/viu00041.xml.
78. Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P., ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM (2006),
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-2690500085.html.
79. Ultimately, over $3 billion was paid to Dalkon Shield victims. See THOMAS H.
KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 119 (2001).
80. See Schwartz, supra note 19, at 3.
81. Id. at 2.
82. Clare L. Roepke & Eric A. Schaff, Long Tail Strings: Impact of the Dalkon
Shield 40 Years Later, OPEN J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 996, 1001 (2014).
83. Martha Kempner, FDA Approves New IUD Designed to Be More Affordable,
RH Reality Check (Mar. 13, 2015), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2015/03/13/fdaapproves-new-iud-designed-affordable/.
84. See Roepke & Schaff, supra note 82, at 1001-02.
85. See The IUD Is Getting More Popular in America. Here’s Why, HUFFINGTON
POST
(Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/24/iud-birthcontrol_n_6736218.html.
86. More US Women Choosing IUDs for Birth Control, FOX NEWS (Aug. 2, 2012),
http://www.foxnews.com/health/2012/08/02/more-us-women-choosing-iuds-for-birth-
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Moreover, thirty-percent of health providers continue to be
unconvinced of the safety of IUDs for women who have never
given birth.87 This is despite the fact that the newest IUD devices
have proven to be extraordinarily safe and are no endorsed by the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.88
C. NORPLANT
Norplant was the first implant contraceptive marketed in the
United States.89 The drug consisted of six hormone-releasing,
silicone coated rods implanted under the skin in the arm.90 The
drug was essentially a new delivery method for levonorgestrel, a
manufactured hormone previously used in the pill forms of birth
control.91 The drug, which cost upwards of $114 million to
develop,92 boasted an effectiveness period of five years.93 First
introduced by the New York based non-profit, “Population
Council,”94 and eventually brought to market by Wyeth-Ayerst in
1991,95 Norplant became one of the most popular contraceptives
in the United States.96 As of 1995, nearly one million United
States women, and 2.5 million women worldwide, used the
Norplant device.97 In sharp contrast to the Dalkon Shield,
Norplant underwent comprehensive studies before being

control.html.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. The Single-Rod Contraceptive Implant, ASS’N OF REPROD. HEALTH PROF’LS
(July
2008),
http://www.arhp.org/publications-and-resources/clinicalproceedings/Single-Rod/History.
90. Drug Company Draws Criticism for Norplant Pricing, ORLANDO SENTINEL
(Sept.
7,
1993),
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1993-0907/business/9309030724_1_norplant-ayres-planning-clinic.
91. See Brown, supra note 44, at 30.
92. Christopher Connell, Norplant Developer Accused Of Making Excessive
Profits,
SEATTLE
TIMES
(Nov.
11,
1993),
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19931111&slug=1731089
.
93. Id.
94. See The Single-Rod Contraceptive Implant, supra note 89.
95. See Drug Company Draws Criticism for Norplant Pricing, supra note 90.
96. CONTRACEPTIVE RESEARCH, INTRODUCTION, AND USE: LESSONS FROM
NORPLANT 110 (Polly F. Harrison & Allan Rosenfield eds., 1998).
97. Sharon Cohen, Norplant Lawsuits Flourish Along With Women’s Reports of
Problems: Medicine: Some Who Have Used the Implanted Contraceptive Have Reported
Serious Side Effects. The Drug Company Defends its Product and Blames Predatory
Lawyers for the Furor., L.A. TIMES (Oct. 8, 1995), http://articles.latimes.com/1995-1008/news/mn-54703_1_side-effects/2.
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introduced to the market.98 Additionally, Norplant was much
more straightforward with respect to listing potential side effects
in its marketing campaign than was Dalkon Shield.99
Inspired by the large verdicts in the Dalkon Shield lawsuits
of the 1980s,100 plaintiffs attorneys boasted thousands of
claimants that complained of “the now-discredited shifting
constellation of symptoms . . . [of] . . . an ill-defined array of autoimmune disorders.”101 Initially attributed to the silicone casting
on the implant,102 and eventually to the hormones within the
implant itself,103 symptoms were almost always reversible and
dissipated once the device was removed from the patient.104
Despite the comparatively benign nature of the product and the
comprehensiveness of the warnings on the device,105 there were
soon several class action suits pending against the manufacturer
of Norplant.106 By 1995, as many as 50,000 women alleged serious
personal injury lawsuits against the manufacturer, with the
claims being consolidated in federal court.107
Finally, in 2002, after a tumultuous decade of litigation and
faltering sales of the device, Wyeth suspended sales of Norplant
in the United States.108 While Norplant had managed to achieve
significant
legal
victories
and
favorable
settlement

98. See Research, Introduction, and Use: Advancing From Norplant, NAT’L CTR.
FOR
BIOTECHNOLOGY
INFO.
(Dec.
1998),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10095968.
99. Birenbaum, supra note 37, at 430. Birenbaum provides a compelling case that
Norplant is a safe, convenient, and effective contraceptive product that was destroyed
by plaintiffs’ attorneys and poor publicity.
100. Jennifer Mesko, Mirena IUD Litigation Revives Memories of Dalkon Shield
Injuries, DRUGWATCH (June 28, 2013), http://drugwatch.com/2013/06/28/mirenalitigation-dalkon-shield-injuries/.
101. Mark Arkin, Products Liability and the Threat to Contraception, MANHATTAN
INST. 1, 8-9 (Feb. 1, 1999), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cjm_36.html.
102. See Brown, supra note 44, at 33.
103. Id. at 33-34.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. L. Stuart Ditzen, How A Promising Contraceptive Fell Victim To Lawsuits
Norplant’s Pa. Maker Has Spent Millions Defending It. Those Who Have Sued Have
Yet to Win A Cent, Or A Major Court Ruling, PHILLY.COM (Dec. 30, 1998),
http://articles.philly.com/1998-12-30/news/25722492_1_norplant-lawsuits-sideeffects-wyeth-ayerst-laboratories.
107. Steven Garber, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF PRODUCT LIABILITY AND OTHER
LITIGATION INVOLVING THE SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF PHARMACEUTICALS, RAND
INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE 38 (2013).
108. See Garber, supra note 107, at 38-39.
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negotiations,109 the Norplant device was simply unable to recover
from the negative publicity.110 Such publicity caused sales of the
drug to plunge dramatically, from 800 units per day in 1993, to
sixty units per day in 1995.111 Sadly, Norplant has since been
shown to be one of the most highly efficacious contraceptives ever
marketed, with failure rates just under one-percent.112 Most
significantly, it has been shown that some of the worst side effects
tend to peter out by the end of the first year of use.113 Anna
Birnbaum, a notable female health scholar, notes that the real
loser of the Norplant litigation was women, who no longer have
access to an otherwise safe and effective birth control method.114
D. RECENT LAWSUITS
Following the Norplant litigation, a few other contraceptiverelated personal injury lawsuits have grabbed headlines.
“Yasmin” and “Yaz” were contraceptive pills brought to the
United States market by Bayer in 2001 and 2006, respectively.115
Both products contain a blend of synthetic hormones known as
drospirenone and ethinyl estradiol,116 although Yaz contains a
lower level of ethinyl estradiol than Yasmin.117 These two
hormones are meant to control ovulation and vaginal fluid levels
to prevent egg fertilization.118 Both products initially showed

109. David J. Morrow, Maker of Norplant Offers a Settlement in Suit Over Effects,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/27/us/maker-ofnorplant-offers-a-settlement-in-suit-over-effects.html.
110. Id.
111. Shari Roan, The Chill in Birth Control Research, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 23, 1998),
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/mar/23/news/mn-31897.
112. See CONTRACEPTIVE RESEARCH, INTRODUCTION, AND USE: LESSONS FROM
NORPLANT, supra note 96, at 38.
113. Id. at 12.
114. See Birenbaum, supra note 37, at 412-13.
115. Gordon Gibb, 10,000 Yaz and Yasmin Lawsuits Just a Cost of Doing
Business?,
LAWYERSANDSETTLEMENTS.COM
(Feb.
28,
2014),
https://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/articles/yasmin-side-effects-yazblood/yasmin-birth-control-lawsuit-side-50-19560.html.
116. Drospirenone And Ethinyl Estradiol (Oral Route), MAYO CLINIC (Jan. 1, 2016),
http://www.mayoclinic.org/drugs-supplements/drospirenone-and-ethinyl-estradioloral-route/description/drg-20061917.
117. A.D.A.M., Inc., Birth Control and Family Planning, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/health/guides/specialtopic/birth-control-and-familyplanning/oral-contraception-and-combination-hormonal-methods.html.
118. Zarah:
Ethinyl
Estradiol/Drospirenone,
WEBMD,
http://www.webmd.com/drugs/2/drug-154621-5115/zarah-oral/ethinylestradioldrospirenone-oral/details (last visited Aug. 1, 2016).
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great promise in preventing pregnancy and having convenient offlabel uses, including the treatment of hormone-related acne.119
By 2009, however, the love affair with the new blend was over,
with these “fourth generation” contraceptive pills becoming
involved in high-profile product liability lawsuits.120 Otherwise
healthy patients were dying or sustained injuries from pulmonary
embolisms, deep vein thrombosis, and other blood clothing
conditions.121 As of April 2014, Bayer had negotiated Yaz and
Yasmin lawsuit settlements with about 8,560 claimants in the
United States.122 To date, Bayer has paid $2 billion to settle
Yasmin and Yaz litigation.123
The German pharmaceutical giant is also facing a new wave
of lawsuits concerning complications caused by its “Mirena” IUS
birth control devices and its “Essure” permanent birth control
devices.124 Mirena is the first IUD marketed since Dalkon
Shield,125 and has been the subject of large-scale lawsuits over
allegations that its warning label inadequately cautioned against
the risk of side effects such as uterine perforation and
migration.126 To date, 1,163 claims have been filed against Bayer
for injuries resulting from its device.127 Many commentators have
drawn comparisons to Dalkon Shield litigation, suggesting that
the Mirena litigation is eerily reminiscent of that era.128 “Essure,”

119. Yaz, DRUGS.COM, http:.//www.drugs.com/yaz.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2016).
120. Yaz/Yasmin Products Liability Litigation: February 2014 Bayer Information
About the Number of Claims, Lawsuits, and Settlements, DRUG INJURY WATCH (Mar.
12,
2014)
(posted
by
Tom
Lamb),
http://www.druginjury.com/druginjurycom/2014/03/yaz-beyaz-yasmin-safyral-lawsuits-filed-claimsunfiled-total-settlements-bayer-litigation-report-february-2014-information.html.
121. Id.
122. Yaz
Lawsuit
Settlements,
DRUG
REP.
(Apr.
23,
2015),
http://drugreporter.com/yaz/lawsuit-settlements/.
123. Austin Kirk, Bayer Still Faces 4,000 Yaz and Yasmin Lawsuits, Even After
$2B
in
Settlements,
ABOUTLAWSUITS.COM
(July
21,
2015),
http://aboutlawsuits.com/yaz-yasmin-lawsuits-after-settlements-85394/.
124. Laura Woods, Essure Lawsuits Cite Issues Similar to Mirena IUD
Complications,
Surgical
Watch
(June
4,
2015),
http://surgicalwatch.com/2015/06/essure-lawsuits-cite-issues-similar-mirena-iudcompliactions/.
125. Jennifer Mesko, Mirena IUD Litigation Revives Memories of Dalkon Shield
Injuries, Drugwatch (June 28, 2013), http://drugwatch.com/2013/06/28/mirenalitigation-dalkon-shield-injuries/.
126. Eleanor Smith, Mirena IUD’s Harmful Side Effects Lead to Multidistrict
Litigation,
Nat’l
Trial
Lawyers
(Sept.
2,
2015),
http://www.thenationaltriallawyers.org/2015/09/mirena-iud-harming-women/.
127. Id.
128. See Mesko, supra note 125.
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on the other hand, involves the insertion of two metal coils inside
the fallopian tube and is meant to instigate a natural tissue
inflammation response to block sperm.129 Litigation on Essure
has just started to get off the ground, with the first lawsuit being
filed in 2014.130 While the precise implications of the Mirena and
Essure litigation is still unclear, these lawsuits suggest that
Bayer will approach with caution its investments in additional
cutting-edge products.
IV. THE RISE OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION
The mass tort litigation that has plagued the pharmaceutical
and medical device industry over the past thirty years has
spurred greater interest from commentators, scholars, and
politicians in offering manufacturers immunity from product
liability lawsuits.131 In support of immunity, legal commentators
and defense attorneys have pointed to the strong basis “that
product liability has been a major factor in discouraging efforts to
develop new contraceptives.”132 Simply speaking, the threat of
liability and subsequent negative publicity has lessened the
economic incentives to become involved in “high risk” medical
products. Over the past ten years, supporters of immunity have
successfully advocated for judicial recognition of the affirmative
defense of federal preemption to shield manufacturers from
burdensome liability.133
129. How Does the Essure® Procedure Work?, Essure: Permanent Birth Control
(Mar. 2016), http://www.essure.com/what-is-essure/how-essure-works.
130. Lauren Gilger, Federal Judge to Decide on Lawsuits Challenging Protected
Status
of
Essure
Birth
Control,
ABC
15
(June
8,
2015),
http://www.abc15.com/news/local-news/investigations/federal-judge-to-rule-onlawsuits-challenging-protected-status-of-essure-birth-control.
131. See, e.g., Joseph F. Petros III, The Other War on Drugs: Federal Preemption,
the FDA, and Prescription Drugs After Wyeth v. Levine, 25 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL’Y 637, 661 (2012) (“[D]enying federal preemption in prescription drug
regulation will deter innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.”); Lisa M. Mottes, The
Need for Federal Preemption of State Tort Claims in the Context of “New Drugs” and
Premarket-Approved Medical Devices, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 723, 726 (2011) (arguing
the FDCA should be amended to include express preemption provision for new drugs);
and RICHARD EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: HOW EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION
STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 201 (2006) (arguing federal preemption is
preferable to product liability litigation).
132. See Garber, supra note 107, at xiv.
133. Eric Lindenfeld & Jasper L. Tran, Beyond Preemption of Generic Drug
Claims, 45 Sw. L. Rev. 101, 104 (2016) (“While the Supreme Court has historically
abided by a strong presumption against implied preemption, the Court has displayed
a growing willingness to reverse their traditional preemption doctrine. This is
especially true in their decisions relating to the FDCA and the preemption of claims
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A. FEDERAL IMPOSSIBILITY PREEMPTION
The doctrine of preemption originates from the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution, which states that
federal law “shall be the supreme law of the land. . . . [A]ny Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.”134 The Supreme Court has since recognized
that State laws that conflict with federal law are “without
effect.”135 There are two ways that a federal law and a state law
can “conflict,” either expressly or impliedly.136 The doctrine of
“express preemption” is self-explanatory, applied when federal
legislation or regulation includes language expressly preempting
state law.137 Implied preemption is applied in three scenarios: (1)
“where state law creates an obstacle for compliance with federal
law”; (2) where federal law “occupies an entire field so as to create
an ‘inference of federal exclusivity’”; or (3) “where it is impossible
for one to comply with both federal and state law.”138 Over the
past six years, pharmaceutical companies have been arguing in
favor of the third option, also known as “impossibility
preemption.”139 As this argument goes, it is impossible to comply
with state law tort standards while simultaneously complying
with its duties under the federal, Food Drug and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA).140 Therefore, companies argue that state law tort
standards should be preempted and plaintiffs should be barred
from bringing state tort lawsuits relating to the drug or device in
made against manufacturers of generic drugs.”).
134. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
135. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. 316, 427 (1819); See also Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88,
108 (1992) (internal quotation omitted) (“[U]nder the Supremacy Clause, from which
our pre-emption doctrine is derived. ‘any state law, however clearly within a State’s
acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.’”);
Felder v. Case, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988).
136. Tyler W. Olson, The Supreme Court’s Overreaching Preemption Interpretation
and Its Consequences: Granting Generic Drug Manufacturers Legal Immunity
Through “The Duty of Sameness” in Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett and PLIVA
v. Mensing, 12 Ind. Health L. Rev. 769, 783 (2015) (citing Jennifer S. Hendricks,
Preemption of Common Law Claims and the Prospects for FIFRA: Justice Stevens Puts
the Genie Back in the Bottle, 15 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F 65, 69 (2004)).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 784 (quoting Hendricks, supra note 136, at 70).
139. See Lindenfeld & Tran, supra note 133, at 105 (“Over the past five years, the
Supreme Court has addressed whether the ANDA approval process and its
corresponding federal ‘sameness’ requirement, conflicts with duties imposed by state
tort law.”).
140. Id. at 106.
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question.141
B. PHARMACEUTICAL PREEMPTION
The FDCA requires FDA approval for a new drug through its
“New Drug Approval” (NDA) process.142 Understanding that the
NDA process is often prohibitively expensive, and recognizing the
need to stimulate the market for generic drugs, Congress
eventually implemented the less-arduous Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) approval process.143 The ANDA approval
process, which is meant to be a less demanding standard than the
NDA, only requires that a generic manufacturer show that the
drug it seeks to have approved is bioequivalent to an already
approved NDA-approved drug.144 Additionally, the generic
manufacturer applying for ANDA approval must ensure that the
generic drug’s label always matches its brand-name
counterpart.145 Any dissimilarity between the two labels will
cause the generic drug’s ANDA application to be denied.146 These
requirements have been dubbed as the “duty of sameness.”147
Over the past six years, large generic manufactures have
successfully argued that they were unable to comply with state
law tort standards because of the ANDA regulations that require
“sameness” in bio-content and warnings of the generic and brand
name drug.148

141. Id. at 108.
142. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355).
143. Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The HatchWaxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 417, 426
(2011) (“This shorter, less-expensive ANDA mechanism for receiving drug approval
has created a boom in the generic drug industry.”).
144. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (West 2013); see also Kelly, supra note 143, at
417 (“Instead of having to submit lengthy preclinical and clinical data demonstrating
the drug’s safety and efficacy to FDA, like that required in an innovator’s New Drug
Application (‘NDA’), the only scientific data that a generic manufacturer must submit
to FDA is data that the drug is ‘bioequivalent’ to the pioneer drug.”).
145. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i) (2012). Certain exceptions to this requirement may
apply.
146. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(d)(7), (j)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
147. Danielle L. Steele, The “Duty of Sameness” as a Shield—Generic Drug
Manufacturers’ Tort Liability and the Need for Label Independence After PLIVA, Inc.
v. Mensing, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 441, 483-84, 487 (2013) (citing PLIVA, Inc. v.
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2574-75, 2593 (2011)).
148. Caitlin Sawyer, Duty of “Sameness”?: Bartlett Preserves Generic Drug
Consumers’ Design Defect Claims, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 10 (Jan. 31, 2013),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent/cgi?article=3281&context=bclr.
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For example, in 2009, in PLIVA v. Mensing,149 the United
States Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff’s state law, failureto-warn claims were preempted because it was impossible for the
generic manufacturer to create more robust, and inclusive,
warnings without violating the federal rules regarding
“sameness.”150 Similarly, in 2013, in Mutual Pharmaceutical Co.
v. Bartlett,151 the Supreme Court applied the same reasoning to
preempt design defect claims made against the manufacturer of
the generic drug, Clinoril.152 Relying heavily upon the reasoning
in Mensing, the Court ruled that New Hampshire’s common law
duty to ensure that a product’s design is adequate was preempted
by the federal law that forbids a generic manufacturer from
making any unilateral changes to a drug’s design that would
cause it to differ from the brand name.153
Recently, courts have begun to extend the reasoning in
Mensing and Bartlett beyond claims against generic
manufacturers to apply to brand name manufacturers.154 For
example, in 2015, in Yates v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,155 the Sixth Circuit became the first
appellate authority to extend the Bartlett design-defect
preemption rationale to a brand name drug.156 In Yates, a woman
suffered a severe stroke one week after beginning the Ortho Evra
contraceptive patch.157 The court ruled that, because the
pharmaceutical company could not make major, unilateral
changes to the composition of a drug post-approval, it was
impossible for the company to comply with the New York tort
standards relating to defectively designed products.158 James
Beck, leading medical device and pharmaceutical product liability
scholar, has tallied five other lower-court decisions that have
applied impossibility preemption to brand name drug products—
a notable shift in the preemption landscape to an even more
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
Id. at 2570, 2578 (2011); see also id. at 2582 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
Id. at 2477-78.
Id. at 2470, 2477.
James M. Beck, Another Decision Applying Bartlett Preemption to All Drugs,
DRUG
&
DEVICE
L.
BLOG
(Oct.
5,
2015),
http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2015/10/another-decision-applyingbartlett.html; see also Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2471.
155. 808 F.3d 281 (6th Cir. 2015).
156. Id. at 293
157. Id. at 288.
158. Id. at 300.

LINDENFELD (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

UNINTENDED PREGNANCY CRISIS

10/22/2016 9:41 AM

305

inclusive regime.159
C. MEDICAL DEVICE PREEMPTION
Like pharmaceutical products, certain classes of medical
devices are required to undergo significant FDA testing before
approval.160 And, also like pharmaceutical products, courts have
authoritatively construed the Medical Device Amendments
(MDA) to the FDCA to preempt any claims made against certain
classes of medical device products.161 For example, in 2008, in
Riegel v. Medtronic,162 the Supreme Court denied a design defect
claim made against a device manufacturer on the grounds that
state law claims were expressly preempted by the MDA.163 Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, was rather forthright with respect
to the growing skepticism of excessive liability for medical device
and drug manufacturers when he stated that tort liability under
negligence or strict liability is “less deserving of preservation” in
the face of federal regulations.164 Many scholars have attributed
this skepticism to preemption’s rise and have noted that “[e]ven
when courts are using the language of preemption doctrine, they
may to some extent be seeking to reform products liability
litigation.”165
Interestingly, there has been a recent push to apply
impossibility preemption to 510(k) approved products by utilizing
the same theories developed in Mensing.166 The 510(k) approval
is the medical device equivalent to the generic drug, ANDA
159. See Beck, supra note 154 (“Just last month we collected all the favorable
precedent applying impossibility preemption under [Bartlett] to innovator drugs –
although the precise subject of that post was preemption of design defect claims
involving § 510(k) medical devices. We were aware of four such rulings, all in the last
year or so: [Yates]; Shah v. Forest Laboratories, Inc.; Booker v. Johnson & Johnson;
[and] Amos v. Biogen Idec, Inc.”) (internal citations omitted).
160. See Robin Helmick Turner, Preemption of State Product Liability Claims
Involving Medical Devices: Premarket Approval as a Shield Against Liability, 72
WASH. L. REV. 963, 965-68 (1997).
161. Id. at 963, 973-74, 976, 990, 994.
162. 552 U.S. 312.
163. Id. at 316, 321
164. Id. at 325.
165. Richard L. Cupp Jr., Preemption’s Rise (and Bit of a Fall) as Products
Liability Reform: Wyeth, Riegel, Altria, and the Restatement (Third)’s Prescription
Product Design Defect Standard, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 727, 729 (2009).
166. James M. Beck, In Case of Good Judge, Break Glass – Implied Impossibility
Preemption in Cases Involving § 510(k) Cleared Medical Devices, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 24,
2015),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail/aspx?g=c2c67d65-2032-4bca-a3820550cd82de10.
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approval process.167 510(k) products have not traditionally been
subject to the protections offered by the MDA express
preemption.168 As a result, this category of devices has been the
prime target of a litany of state tort law claims over the past five
years.169 James Beck touches on these recent developments in a
recent article, arguing that the 510(k) “substantial equivalence”
process is amenable to a “duty of sameness” type of argument as
used in the Mensing and Bartlett decisions.170 While no known
cases have yet to utilize such an argument, we should expect to
see defendants test the boundaries of the MDA’s precise
preemptive scope.
D. FEDERAL PREEMPTION IS A POOR SOLUTION TO THE
GROWING CRISIS
Despite data suggesting that manufacturers may respond
positively to a decrease in potential liability,171 federal
preemption is an unnecessarily broad, and draconian approach,
with concerning implications for those injured by medical and
pharmaceutical products.172 Under a federal preemption regime,
all users of medical and pharmaceutical products are barred from
bringing any claims under either strict liability or negligence
theories.173 This problem is particularly troublesome for women,
who have historically suffered more severe, physically grotesque
and personal injures than the typical consumer, and are now at
an even greater risk of being barred from any form of
compensation.174 This is especially true for low-income women,
who are more likely to opt for the generic substitute of any oral
contraceptive product—liability for which has already been

167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. Beck cautions defense attorneys that such an approach should only be
taken “[i]n cases where you believe this novel defense-side argument will receive fair
consideration and bears a colorable chance of success.”
171. Lindsey K. Peterson, Evading Preemption: The State’s Search for Recovery for
the Masses, 9 CHARLESTON L. REV. 403, 424 (2015).
172. Id. at 404.
173. See Lindenfeld & Tran, supra note 133, at 103, 108, 110, 112-13; see also Jesse
Morris, Third Circuit Confirms Preemption Scope of Mensing and Bartlett, PRODUCT
LIAB. MONITOR (May 6, 2014), http://product-liability.weil.com/preemption/thirdcircuit-confirms-preemption-scope-of-mensing-and-bartlett/.
174. Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice
in Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1, 24, 29, 48, 53-54 (1995).
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foreclosed by the holdings in Mensing and Bartlett.175
Federal preemption may even contribute to a decrease in the
use of contraceptive products, and, thus, to an increase in the
unwanted pregnancy rate.176 Women, who will have inevitably
heard of the succession of contraceptive failures and injuries, will
also be aware that they are now at risk for a lack of compensation
should they be injured. These women will increasingly turn to
more benign, and less effective, modes of birth control.177
Similarly, doctors will turn to prescribing lower risk, and less
effective, contraceptive products to insulate themselves from
potential liability arising from the use of contraceptive
products.178 In this sense, federal preemption will also have a
cooling effect on the market for contraceptive products that offsets
any benefits that might be achieved through insulation of
liability.
Most importantly, proponents of federal preemption place too
much faith upon the FDA regulatory process in ensuring that a
product is dispenses at its maximum safety levels.179 The threat
of liability has been determined to be one of the most significant
motivators in ensuring that manufacturers engage in thorough
pre- and post-market testing of their products.180 Indeed, the
FDA sets only a minimum threshold of safety and does not require
or encourage vigorous aftermarket studies.181 Furthermore, pre175. See Lindenfeld & Tran, supra note 133, at 109 (“This void in pre-market and
post-market safety for generic drugs is particularly troubling considering that the
market for generic drugs increases exponentially every year, and that the primary
consumers of generic drugs are low income.” (citing Daniel Perrone, Crafting an
Exception
to
the
Mensing
Ruling,
JURIST
(Apr.
11,
2013),
http://jurist.org/dateline/2013/04/daniel-perrone-generic-drugs.php.)).
176. Marie Boyd, Unequal Protection Under the Law: Why FDA Should Use
Negotiated Rulemaking to Reform the Regulation of Generic Drugs, 35 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1525, 1577 (2014).
177. See id. (“Consumers concerned about the different potential legal remedies
for brand-name and generic drugs may request brand-name drugs.”).
178. See Daniel Kazhdan, Wyeth and PLIVA: The Law of Inadequate Drug
Labeling, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 893, 894, 914-16 (2012) (Arguing federal
preemption will create public pressure on states, doctors, and pharmacists to avoid
prescribing medications of which private causes of action have been foreclosed by
preemption).
179. Elissa Levy, The Health Act’s FDA Defense to Punitive Damages: A Gift to
Drug Makers or to the Public?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2448-49, 2451-52 (2006).
180. See generally James M. Beck, Federal Preemption in FDA-Regulated ProductLiability Litigation: Where We Are and Where We Might Be Headed, 32 HAMLINE L.
REV. 657, 659 (2009) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521
(1992)).
181. Brittany Croom, Buyer Beware: Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett
Continues to Alter the True Costs and Risks of Generic Drugs, 15 N.C. J. L. & TECH.
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marketing clinical trials are necessarily limited, as they cannot
take into account all the long-term effects of a drug at the time of
approval.182 As Justice Sotomayor aptly noted in her dissent in
Mensing, “‘[s]tate tort suits uncover unknown drug hazards and
provide incentives for drug manufacturers to disclose safety risks
promptly.’ Thus, we recognized, ‘state law offers an additional,
and important, layer of consumer protection that complements
FDA regulation.’”183
Lastly, judicial recognition of federal impossibility
preemption as a viable affirmative defense in the pharmaceutical
and medical device arena will contribute to a volatile, and
unpredictable, preemption regime.
A judicially-originated
process of reform is an unavoidably haphazard, inconsistent
process as jurisdictions begin to implement the general rule of
law.
Recently, in Reckis v. Johnson & Johnson,184 the
Massachusetts Supreme Court exemplified this phenomenon
when they refused to comply with over six years worth of federal
case law precedent, holding that a claim against a drug
manufacturer was not preempted because the defendant failed to
show that the FDA did not approve a change in a drug’s label. 185
As Reckis demonstrates, judicial standards will necessarily
become increasingly dissimilar and muddled as more jurisdictions
increasingly grapple with federal preemption principles.186
V. NO-FAULT FIX TO THE CONTRACEPTIVE AND
UNINTENDED PREGNANCY CRISIS
In light of the decreased research and development of
contraceptive products, as well as the misguided application of

ON. 1, 24, 29 (2014) (quoting Stacey B. Lee, PLIVA v. Mensing: Generic Consumers’
Unfortunate Hand, 12 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 209, 245 (2012)),
http://ncjolt.org/buyer-beware-mutual-pharmaceutical-co-v-bartlett-continues-toalter-thetrue-costs-and-risks-of-generic-drugs/.
182. See Cupp, supra note 165, at 752 (“The [Wyeth] Court emphasized that the
FDA has only limited resources to monitor the thousands of drugs on the market, and
that the tort system may be especially helpful in regulating new risks that may emerge
in drugs’ postmarketing phase.”).
183. PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2592 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Wyeth v.
Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1202-03 (2009) (internal citation omitted)).
184. 28 N.E.3d 445, 458 (Mass. 2015).
185. This is despite the fact that the Supreme Court in Wyeth v. Levine was clear
that a defendant was only required to show “clear evidence that the FDA would not
have approved a change [in labeling].” See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1198 (emphasis added).
186. See generally Reckis, 28 N.E.3d at 455-61 (Mass. 2015).
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federal preemption in response to such issues,187 lawmakers
should be urged to investigate alternatives to the existing state
law compensation schemes for injured consumers of contraceptive
products. The most plausible alternative to the existing scheme
is a no-fault compensation plan for those injured by contraceptive
products. Such a scheme could be modeled around the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (NCVIA).188
A. THE NATIONAL CHILDHOOD VACCINE INJURY ACT OF
1986
The NCVIA189 was passed in response to shortages of
vaccines in the 1970s and 1980s.190 Such shortages were a direct
result of product liability lawsuits brought by consumers gravely
injured by vaccine products.191 These lawsuits generated a
greater perceived risk of exposure to vaccine manufacturers and
caused them to effectively vacate the industry.192 The Act,
intended to relieve much of the liability burden on manufacturers
of these products,193 instituted a no-fault compensation plan for
those injured by vaccines and related products.194 The Act
authorizes the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP) to
issue pre-determined awards contingent upon a number of
factors, including whether an alleged injury has is found to be
“vaccine related.”195 However, no inquiry is made into whether
the manufacturer had breached any duty of safety, and as such,
it is truly a “strict liability” process.196
Although those plaintiffs who disagree with the award can
petition for redress of their claims in federal court under statelaw product liability standards,197 they are explicitly barred from
bringing design defect and failure-to-warn claims, as well as from
187.
188.
189.
190.

See discussion supra, Parts III.D. & IV.D.
42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-1 (West 2015).
42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-1 (West 2015).
Kapil Kumar Bhanot, What Defense a Public Health Emergency? An Analysis
of the Strategic National Stockpile and the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act: The
Need for Prevention of Nonterror National Medical Emergencies, 21 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 137, 141 (2005).
191. Id. (“The government’s initial response to vaccine shortages was to protect the
vaccine industry from lawsuits.”).
192. See Brown, supra note 44, at 1.
193. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-1 (West 2015).
194. See Garber, supra note 107, at 40.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 18.
197. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-12(e)(1) (West 2015).
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receiving punitive damages absent “fraud,” “intentional and
wrongful withholding of information,” or “other criminal or illegal
activity.”198 The program is intended to be self-funded, and is
financed by a seventy-five-cent excise tax on each sale of a
vaccine.199 A claimant may recover lifelong medical expenses, lost
earnings, attorney fees and up to $250,000 for pain and
suffering.200
B. SUCCESS OF THE NCVIA
The NCVIA has proven to be successful at insulating
manufacturers from volatile and unpredictable liability from
defective products.201
This is evidenced by a number of
manufacturers returning to the vaccine market after the passage
of the act, and the development new and useful products.202
Indeed, only four years after passage of the act,203 the New York
Times noted “a major revival in vaccine research by private
pharmaceutical companies.”204 In the 1990s, the revival was even
more dramatic—prices of vaccines had decreased dramatically,
and more people were getting vaccinated than at any other time
in history.205
Most importantly, manufacturers have developed many
vaccines that did not exist before the crisis,206 and have also
198. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 229, 243 (2011); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa23(d)(2)(A)-(C) (West 2015).
199. About the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Vaccine Injury
Compensation Trust Fund, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. ADMIN. (HRSA),
http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/about/index.html (last visited Aug. 21,
2016) (The Trust Fund is “[f]unded by a $.75 excise tax . . . on each dose (i.e., disease
that is prevented) of a vaccine.”).
200. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-15 (West 2015); see also Nora Freeman Engstrom, A Dose
of Reality for Specialized Courts: Lessons From the VICP, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1661
(2015).
201. Mary Holland, Louis Conte, & Robert Krakow, Unanswered Questions from
the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: A Review of Compensated Cases of VaccineInduced Brain Injury, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 480, 480, 486 (2011).
202. Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans
Opting out of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 353, 408, 410
(2004).
203. See generally National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C.A. §
300aa-1 (West 2015).
204. See Arkin, supra note 101, at 17.
205. See Elizabeth C. Scott, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act Turns
Fifteen, 56 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 351, 357 (2001).
206. See Sara Wexler, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth: The “Unavoidable” Vaccine Problem,
6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 93, 104 (2011) (“Since the 1986 enactment
of the Vaccine Act, manufacturers have brought over twenty new vaccines to market.”).
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improved significantly on existing vaccines.207 For example, in
1986, children were immunized against seven diseases.208 Today,
children are regularly immunized against eight additional
diseases: haemophilus influenza type B, hepatitis A, hepatitis, B,
influenza, meningococcal disease, pneumococcal disease,
rotavirus, and varicella.209 Another notable example includes the
recently developed HPV vaccine,210 which, in 2014, was FDA
approved for administration to protect against nine strains of
HPV, a cancer-causing virus.211 Other vaccines developed since
the initiation of the Act now protect against two types of viruses
that cause seventy-percent of cervical cancers.212
Drug
manufacturers are also rushing to develop new, geneticallyengineered vaccines for diseases such as HIV, heroine addiction,
cocaine addiction, and gonorrhea.213 And, while cancer vaccines
have been pursued for years, dozens of potential vaccines are
finally in the late stages of clinical trials.214
Fascinating new techniques and delivery method have also
been developed since the initiation of the Act.215 For decades,
207. Scott, supra note 205, at 357.
208. Brief Amici Curiae of the American Academy of Pediatrics and 21 Other
Physician and Public Health Organizations in Support of Respondent at 27,
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 562 U.S. 223 (2011) (No. 09-152, 2010 WL 3017751, at *27.
209. Id.
210. See FDA Approves Gardasil 9 for Prevention of Certain Cancers Caused by
Five Additional Types of HPV, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.: FDA NEWS RELEASE (Dec.
10,
2014),
http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm426485.htm.
211. Id.
212. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Recommended Immunization
Schedules for Persons Aged 0 Through 18 Years —- United States, 2010, 58 MMWR 14 (Jan. 8, 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5851a6.htm; Ctrs.
for Disease Control & Prevention, Quadrivalent Human Papillomavirus Vaccine:
Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 56
MMWR 1-24 (Mar. 12, 2007).
213. See Barbara Loe Fisher, The Vaccine Culture War in America: Are You
Ready?, NAT’L VACCINE INFO. CTR. (Mar. 8, 2015), http://www.nvic.org/nvic-vaccinenews/march-2015/the-vaccine-culture-war-in-america-are-you-ready.aspx
(“Drug
Companies . . . are rushing to licens[e] . . . vaccines for syphilis, gonorrhea, herpes,
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, chlamydia, hepatitis C, e-coli, cytomegalovirus, ebola,
salmonella, norovirus, adenovirus, enterovirus, asthma, diabetes, obesity, high blood
pressure, anti-smoking, anti-cocaine and anti-heroin use, and many more.”).
214. The Future of Vaccines, VACCINES TODAY: THE BLOG (Mar. 27, 2014),
http://www.vaccinestoday.eu/diseases/the-future-of-vaccines-2/ (“In the past, plenty of
vaccines have fallen at the last hurdle but vaccines for prostate cancer, colorectal
cancer, brain tumours, and melanoma (amongst others) continue to look promising.
Indeed, a prostate cancer vaccine has recently been given the thumbs up by regulators
in the US.”).
215. See A Report of the National Vaccine Advisory Committee: Strengthening the
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vaccines have strictly depended upon the “attenuation” technique,
which relies on weakened or killed viruses to provoke an immune
response.216 However, since the Vaccine Act, new and other
cutting-edge techniques have been employed with high degrees of
success.217 The first recombinant vaccine was licensed and
approved in 1986 for use in the United States, first offering an
effective method at preventing the Hepatitis B virus.218 Today,
much of the new research depends on the “live recombinant
vaccine” technique, which utilizes attenuated viruses or bacterial
strains as delivery devices for genes intended to provoke an
immune response.219 This technique has been touted as the most
promising for development of an HIV vaccine.220 Another
technique that shows great promise is the “DNA Vaccine,” which
Supply of Routinely Recommended Vaccines in the United States, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH
&
HUM.
SERVS.,
THE
NAT’L
VACCINE
ADVISORY
COMM.
(NVAC),
http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo/nvac/nvac-vsr.html (“The VICP has assisted in stimulating
the availability of new vaccines since its inception in 1988.”).
216. Louis
Pasteur,
CHEMICAL
HERITAGE
FOUND.,
http://www.chemheritage.org/discover/online-resources/chemistry-inhistory/themes/pharmaceuticals/preventing-and-treating-infectiousdiseases/Pasteur.aspx (last visited Aug. 1, 2016) (Discussing how Louis Pasteur’s
research “led to his discovery of how to make vaccines by attenuating, or weakening,
the microbe involved.”).
217. Lisa Winter, Cutting-Edge Technology Aiding Development of Novel Synthetic
Polio Vaccine, IFLSCIENCE (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.iflscience.com/health-andmedicine/cutting-edge-technology-aiding-development-novel-synthetic-polio-vaccine.
For a discussion on emerging technology, see generally Jasper L. Tran, To Bioprint or
Not to Bioprint, 17 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 123, 133 (2015) (discussing bioprinting); Jasper
L. Tran, The Law and 3D Printing, 31 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 505,
505-07 (2015) (discussing 3D printing); Jasper L. Tran & Derek Tri Tran,
(De)Regulating Neuroenhancement, 37 U. LA. VERNE. L. REV. 179, 183-91 (2015)
(discussing neuroenhancement); Jasper L. Tran, A Primer on Digital Rights
Management Technologies, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: A LIBRARIAN’S GUIDE
(Catherine A. Lemmer & Carla P. Wale eds., 2016) (discussing digital rights
management technologies); and Jasper L. Tran, Press Clause and 3D Printing, 14 NW.
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 75, 77 (2016) (“Technology is progressing at an extraordinary
speed.”).
218. See
Types
of
Vaccines,
VACCINES.GOV
(July
23,
2013),
http://www.vaccines.gov/more_info/types/ (“A recombinant subunit vaccine has been
made for the hepatitis B virus. Scientists inserted hepatitis B genes that code for
important antigens into common baker’s yeast. The yeast then produced the antigens,
which the scientists collected and purified for use in the vaccine.”); Hepatitis B Vaccine
History,
HEPATITIS
B
FOUND.
(Oct.
21,
2009),
http://www.hepb.org/professionals/hepatitis_b_vaccine.htm.
219. See Types of Vaccines, supra note 218.
220. This is because HIV cannot be attenuated enough to be given to humans, and
could cause AIDS. See Types of HIV Vaccines, NAM: Aidsmap,
http://www.aidsmap.com/types-of-hiv-vaccines/page/1065633/ (last visited Aug. 1,
2016).
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involves the injection of the DNA coding for an antigen directly
into the muscle.221 This technique has been noted as a potentially
potent weapon against diseases such as malaria.222
C. NCVIA AS A MODEL FOR THE CONTRACEPTIVE CRISIS
The staggering costs of unwanted pregnancies, the increased
dissatisfaction with existing contraceptive methods, and the lack
of innovation in contraceptive products indicates a clear need for
immediate congressional action.223 Given the tremendous growth
and diversification of the vaccine industry following the passing
of the NCVIA, it is suggested that an identical, no-fault approach
be adopted for contraceptive products marketed in the United
States.224 A no-fault system based on the NCVIA would strike an
ideal balance of product safety and product innovation. With
threat of liability under the no-fault act, as well as through state
law tort remedies, if a claimant is not satisfied with his no-fault
act award, device manufacturers will still be motivated to prevent
injury. However, the no-fault system will not impose excessive
liability upon manufacturers, as it will disallow punitive damages
against manufacturers except in situations involving criminal
conduct, fraud, or non-compliance with the FDCA.225
With each manufacturer being required to “pay into” the
system on a per-contraceptive-sold basis,226 device manufacturers
will better be able to predict costs associated with producing a
contraceptive product.
No longer will contraceptive
manufacturing executives be leery of huge Dalkon-like awards, or

221. Robert G. Whalen, DNA Vaccines for Emerging Infectious Diseases: What If?,
2
Emerging
Infectious
Diseases
168,
168
(Sept.
1996),
http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/pdfs/vol2no3_pdf-version.pdf.
222. Malaria: SynCon® Vaccines Targeting Malaria, INOVIO (2014),
http://www.inovio.com/products/infectious-disease-vaccines/malaria/ (last visited Aug.
1, 2016).
223. See discussion supra, Parts III & IV.
224. Janet Benshoof, Protecting Consumers, Prodding Companies, and Preventing
Conception: Toward a Model Act for No Fault Liability for Contraceptives, 23 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 403, 430-31 (1997).
225. See Mark Geistfeld, The Political Economy of Neocontractual Proposals for
Products Liability Reform, 72 TEX. L. REV. 803, 808-09 n.25 (1994); Bruesewitz, 562
U.S. at 229-30; 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-23(d)(2)(A)-(C) (West 2015); Katherine M. Glaser,
A Step Toward Preemption: The Effect of the FDA’s 2006 Preamble, 80 TEMP. L. REV.
871, 887 (2007).
226. See, e.g., About the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Vaccine
Injury Compensation Trust Fund, supra note 195.
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Norplant-like publicity.227 The claims will be quietly and
efficiently settled through the no-fault program, offering adequate
compensation for women injured by contraceptive products and,
at the same time, avoiding huge windfalls for plaintiffs’ attorneys.
It is conceded that significant questions remain in determining
the precise dollar amount of the tax per contraceptive that
manufacturers would be required to pay out. It is also conceded
that this amount would necessarily require constant
modifications as dangers of particular products become more
known and widespread. However, the scheme clearly offers a
significantly more balanced approach than what is currently in
place.
Of course, many women who have suffered non-economic
damages exceeding the $250,000 cap may appear to be ill-served
by the scheme.228 However, these claimants will still have the
ability to pursue strict liability and negligence causes of action
against a manufacturer should they be dissatisfied with their nofault award.229 Moreover, like the NCVIA, a no-fault program for
contraceptive products would relieve a claimant from much of
their burden of proving causation.230 This is because claimants
would only be require to show by a preponderance of the evidence
an injury suffered that is listed on a pre-determined table.231
Most critically, women’s interest as a whole will increasingly be
advanced as research and development into newer and safer

227. See discussion supra, Part III (discussing the tremendous impact Norplant
publicity and Dalkon Shield jury awards had upon the profitability of those devices).
228. This problem is particularly troubling given that women have traditionally
suffered more grotesque and life-altering injuries as a result of defective products. A
contraceptive device is likely to cause similar catastrophic injuries that far exceed the
mandated cap. See generally Koenig & Rustad, supra note 174, at 23, 80, 85, 87.
229. Under a no-fault scheme, a woman dissatisfied with her award will have even
more litigation options than a consumer of a vaccine product that is dissatisfied with
his or her award. This is because, under Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402A,
comment k, strict liability claims against vaccine manufacturers are precluded.
However, no such preclusion categorically applies to contraceptive products. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. L. INST. 1965)
230. Michael Regan, Health Care Law-Resolving Disputed Diagnoses Prior to
Applying the Althen Test in Claims Brought Pursuant to the National Childhood
Vaccine Act—Lombardi v. Sec’y of Health & Human Services, 656 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2011), 8 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 315, 320 (2013).
231. William Dobreff, The National Vaccine Compensation Act No-Fault for
Vaccine Injuries, 69 MICH. B. J. 806, 807 (1990) (“For certain types of injuries occurring
within the time frame set forth on the table after administration of the vaccine there
is a presumption of causation. The burden of proof for proving a Table case is a
preponderance of the evidence.”).
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contraceptives becomes reinvigorated as a result of the scheme.232
D. MODIFICATIONS AND COMPLIMENTS TO A NCVIA-TYPE
SYSTEM
As discussed in Section C., the NCVIA does not explicitly
foreclose private actions against a vaccine manufacturer so long
as the claimant has exhausted all his avenues through the Act.233
The Act does, however, explicitly prohibit claimants from ever
alleging failure to warn claims in the private suit.234 In 2011,
vaccine manufacturers were further insulated from private suits
when the Supreme Court, in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC,235 held
that claimants are also forever prohibited from bringing design
defect claims against a manufacturer of a vaccine. Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, was characteristic in his assault on state
tort liability when he held that design defect claims are “[t]he
most speculative and difficult type of products liability claim to
litigate,”236 and leaving them available to plaintiffs would “hardly
coax manufacturers back into the market.”237 In this respect, and
in the face of the Supreme Court’s long-held presumption against
preemption,238 the Supreme Court held almost all avenues of
private redress against vaccine manufacturers as completely
foreclosed.239 The impact of the decision will have enormous
rippling effects on product safety and claimant recovery for those
injured for vaccine products.240
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See discussion supra, Parts III & V.
See discussion supra, Part V.B.
Id.
Bruesewitz, 562 U.S. at 243.
Id. at 240.
Id.
Kendra D. Hanson, The End of Design-Defect Claims: The Supreme Court’s
Immunization of Vaccine Manufacturers in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC [131 S. Ct. 1068
(2011)], 51 WASHBURN L. J. 737, 746 (2012) (“Because preemption has such significant
effects, the Supreme Court has established what has come to be known as a
presumption against preemption.”).
239. Bruesewitz, 562 U.S. at 243.
240. See, e.g., Hanson, supra note 238, at 765 (arguing that state design-defect
claims should be allowed to proceed because of their powerful role in supplementing
federal regulations regarding vaccine safety: “such a system is better not only for the
individual plaintiffs but for public safety as a whole.”); Eva B. Stensvad, Immunity for
Vaccine Manufacturers: The Vaccine Act and Preemption of Design Defect Claims, 95
Minn. L. Rev. 315, 318 (2011) (Arguing that the Bruesewitz Court put a sizeable
portion of consumers at unnecessary risk); and Mary J. Davis, The Case Against
Preemption: Vaccines & Uncertainty, 8 Ind. Health L. Rev. 293, 316 (2011) (discussing
the disastrous effects of foreclosing design defect claims against vaccine
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Considering the recent decision in Bruesewitz, when drafting
a no-fault act for contraceptives, Congress should be explicit and
unambiguous in allowing design defect and failure to warn claims
to proceed if a claimant has exhausted all remedies under the act.
A no-fault system that shield contraceptive manufacturers from
large-scale liability is necessary to reinvigorate the contraceptive
market. However, this system should be carefully balanced
against a claimant’s ability to be made whole.241 In the future,
there will invariably be women severely injured from
contraceptive products who cannot with precision prove
placement on any pre-determined, injury/compensation table, and
who require alternative, civil remedies.242 As discussed in
previous sections, wholesale preemption of any class of injury is
an unnecessarily draconian approach that can cause
manufacturers to purposely disregard information about
deficiencies in their warnings or design.243
In adopting a no-fault act for contraceptives, Congress should
also be aware that drug manufacturers may not immediately be
receptive to a decrease in liability, especially with a new tax
imposed upon them by the no-fault act.244 In the event that the
market is not immediately responsive, Congress should consider
adopting an Orphan Drug Act245-type of approach to complement
the no-fault system, and to jump start investment by private
manufacturers.246 The Orphan Drug Act, passed in 1983, was
created to attract manufacturers to design products for a market
that would otherwise be too small to be profitably by giving them
monopoly rights over the market.247 The Act has proven
successful in facilitating the research or development of drugs for
rare diseases, such as ALS, Huntington’s disease, and Myoclonus,
manufacturers).
241. See Daniel A. Cantor, Striking a Balance Between Product Availability and
Product Safety: Lessons from the Vaccine Act, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1853, 1856, 1902 (1995)
(Arguing that no-fault scheme generally serves its purpose, but must take into account
policy considerations including product safety and ability of injured claimant to be
made whole).
242. Benshoof, supra note 224, at 425.
243. See discussion supra, Part IV.C.
244. Veronica Henry, Problems with Pharmaceutical Regulation in the United
States: Drug Lag and Orphan Drugs, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 617, 636 (1993).
245. Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 360aa).
246. See Gary A. Pulsinelli, The Orphan Drug Act: What’s Right With It, 15 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 299, 304, 325-26, 344 (1999) (discussing the incredible
promise of an orphan drug-oriented scheme).
247. See id. at 301, 310.
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which all affect small numbers of people residing in the United
States.248 Under an Orphan Drug Act approach, a limited number
of contraceptive manufacturers could be given exclusive market
control for a set period of time, contingent upon their development
of new and cutting-edge contraceptive technologies.249
VI. CONCLUSION
In the United States, there is an ongoing public health
problem relating to unintended pregnancies. The unintended
pregnancy rate is particularly concerning, given that childbirths
that result from unintended or closely-spaced pregnancies are
correlated with negative outcomes for the parent and child. While
it is true that two-thirds of women in the United States are on
some form of contraception,250 almost half of all unintended
pregnancies result from women who use their contraception
inconsistently or incorrectly.251 The most widely reported reason
for contraceptive nonuse or gaps in use is dissatisfaction with
available contraception methods and concerns about side effects
of alternatives.252
Despite the fact that women consistently express
dissatisfaction with existing contraception methods,253 the
availability of the newer, safer, and more comfortable
contraceptive methods remains stagnant.254 The threat of
excessive liability, as evidenced from the Dalkon Shield and

248. Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 1(b)(1), 96 Stat. 2049 (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 360aa) (“[T]here are many diseases and conditions,
such as Huntington’s disease, myoclonus, ALS (Lou Gehrig’s disease), Tourette
syndrome, and muscular dystrophy which affect such small number of individuals
residing in the United States that the diseases and conditions are considered rare in
the United States.”).
249. Benshoof, supra note 224, at 430.
250. See Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. 1, 3 (Mar.
2016),
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pubs/FB-UnintendedPregnancy-US.pdf.
251. Id.
252. CDC Report Shows Women Highly Likely to Discontinue Use of Hormonal
Contraceptive
Methods,
CYCLEBEADS
(July
15,
2013),
https://www.cyclebeads.com/blog/801/cdc-report-shows-women-highly-likely-todiscontinue-use-of-hormonal-contraceptive-methods.
253. See id.
254. See generally The Stagnant Contraceptives Industry: Birth Control: Lawsuits,
Red Tape and The Religious Lobby Have Slowed Innovations, Drug Firms Say. The
Pill Remains the Most Trusted Method., L.A. TIMES (May 17, 1995),
http://articles.latimes.com/1995-05-17/business/fi-2897_1_birth-control-methods.
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Norplant litigation,255 has caused contraceptive manufacturers to
abandon the market in droves.256 Only a few contraceptive
manufacturers continue to invest in contraceptive research.257
Over the past ten years, critics of liability have successfully
advocated for judicially imposed federal preemption of drug and
device claims as the primary vehicle to shield manufacturers from
burdensome liability.258 However, despite the data that suggests
that manufacturers may respond positively to a decrease in
potential liability,259 federal preemption is an unnecessarily broad
and radical approach to implications for those injured by medical
and pharmaceutical products.260
Lawmakers should be urged to investigate alternatives to the
existing state law compensation schemes and wholesale
preemption of contraceptive products. The most plausible
alternative to the existing scheme is a no-fault compensation plan
for those injured by contraceptive products.261 Such a scheme
could be modeled around the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act of 1986, which has proven to be successful at insulating
manufacturers from volatile and unpredictable liability from
defective products. Most importantly, a no-fault system based on
the NCVIA might strike an ideal balance of contraceptive product
safety and product innovation.

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

See supra notes 68-79, 100-07, and accompanying text.
See supra notes 37-42, and accompanying text.
See supra note 42, and accompanying text.
See supra note 133, and accompanying text.
See supra note 171, and accompanying text.
See supra note 172, and accompanying text.
See supra Part V.

